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Hitchcock: Evidence - Pretrial Discovery of Uncharged Misconduct Evidence -

EVIDENCE - Pretrial Discovery of Uncharged Misconduct Evidence No More Pulling the Uncharged Misconduct Card From the Sleeve.
Howard v. State, 42 P.3d 483 (Wyo. 2002).
INTRODUCTION

In April 1998, Carrie Huff lived with Warren Harlow and his wife.'
During that time, Huff was in the process of getting a divorce from her husband, Eric Huff. 2 It was also during this period that Carrie Huff wrote her3
husband's credit card numbers down and gave them to Warren Harlow.
Harlow never actually possessed the credit card, but used the numbers to
purchase gasoline, cigarettes, groceries, and other items from both the Phillips 66 store and the Trailside Convenience Store in Casper, Wyoming.'
Melody Howard was a clerk at both convenience stores where Harlow used
the numbers to obtain goods and sometimes money from cash back transactions.5
In May 1998, Eric Huff received his Visa bill with around fifteen
unauthorized charges, totaling approximately $950.6 Huff contacted the
credit card company and completed an affidavit of forgery. 7 An investigation soon followed.8 None of the signatures on the sales slips was legitimate. 9 All of the fraudulent sales slips except one were signed "Eric Huff."
The one exception was a sales slip signed "Carrie Huff."' 1 Storeowners at
the Phillips 66 were informed they would be charged back for the unauthorized charges to Eric Huff's card." Four sales slips had been processed on
Huff s credit card at the Phillips 66, totaling $273.46.12 Later that summer,
management for the Trailside Convenience Store in Casper was informed
that Howard had processed similar transactions as an employee at that
store. 3 The Trailside's regional supervisor had all the sales slips pulled

i.
Howard v. State, 42 P.3d 483, 484 (Wyo. 2002).
2.
Id.
3.
Id.
4.
Id.; Brief for Appellee at 5, Howard v. Wyoming, 42 P.3d 483 (Wyo. 2002) (No. 00243) [hereinafter Appellee's Brief]. These are the facts as alleged by the State. The facts in
this case are not disputed significantly. The disputed issue in this case lies in the interpretation of Wyoming Rule of Evidence 404(b).
5.
Howard,42 P.3d at 484 (Wyo. 2002).
6.
Appellee's Brief, supra note 4, at 5.
7. Id.
8.
Id.
9.
Id.
10.
Id. at7.
11.
Id.
12.
Id.
13.
Id.
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from the suspect transactions. 4 The Trailside had processed eleven transacof the charges at both stores had occurred
tions, totaling $694.33." All
6
working.'
was
while Howard
When questioned, Howard claimed she asked Harlow if he had permission to use the numbers.' 7 Harlow insisted that Carrie Huff had the card
and that she had given him permission to use the numbers.'" Howard
9
claimed she verified that Harlow had permission to use the numbers.
Howard claimed that before one of the transactions, Harlow made a phone
2°
call to someone Harlow said was Eric Huff and handed her the phone. The
person on the other line told Howard that Harlow had permission to use the
card. 2' Howard admitted that she manually entered the numbers into the
22
machine and that Harlow signed Eric Huff's name on the charge slips. A
criminal information was filed and an arrest warrant was issued in January,
charging Howard with two counts of forgery, two counts of conspiracy to
commit forgery, and one count of unlawful use of a credit card.23
Prior to trial, Defense counsel filed a paper captioned: "Defendant's
Demand for a Speedy Trial and Demand for Notice of Intent to Introduce
Evidence Under 404(b)."24 The Defense also filed several motions in limine
to bar the prosecution from: (1) introducing evidence under Wyoming Rule
of Evidence 404(b) (hereinafter WRE 404(b)); (2) mentioning any of Howard's drug related activity; (3) using her prior criminal history; or (4) mentioning that she had flunked a urinalysis test while on parole. Despite these
Id.
14.
Id.
15.
Howard v. State, 42 P.3d 483, 484 (Wyo. 2002).
16.
Appellee's Brief, supra note 4, at 5.
17.
Id.
18.
Id.
19.
Id.
20.
Id.
21.
Id.
22.
Id. at 2;
23.
Howard v. State, 42 P.3d 483, 485 (Wyo. 2002). There is no precedent for the de24.
mand to create a burden on the part of the State to disclose the evidence, but it appears the
defense was planning on using the demand to bolster their argument that admitting the evidence would be unfair. The demand, in relevant part, provided:
The Defendant Hereby Further Demands the State provide Notice of intent to introduce any evidence under Rule 404(b) of the Wyoming Rules
of Evidence (W.R.E.). Said Notice shall include the specific evidence the
State wishes to introduce, and the legal authority or theory for the admissibility of same. Said Notice shall also be given to the Defense in a
timely manner prior to the trial in this matter so the Defense may prepare
objections and request a hearing to determine the admissibility of said
evidence.
Howard, 42 P.3d at 485.
WYo.R.EvID. 404(b) [hereinafter WRE 404(b)]; Appellee's Brief, supra note 3, at 3.
25.
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demands, the morning of trial the State gave the first indication it planned to
introduce evidence of Howard's illegal drug use, specifically methamphetamines. 26 The State intended to show that Howard used the money from the
cash back transactions to buy drugs 2 The State planned to introduce the
drug evidence through testimony from Harlow and the police detective who
interviewed Howard.28
Defense counsel objected to the introduction of the evidence because they were not given notice of the intent to use the evidence (especially
in light of the demand for notice of intent to use such evidence) and on the
grounds that the evidence would be more prejudicial than probative, was not
relevant, and would only confuse the jury.29 The district court decided to
admit the evidence under WRE 404(b) as proof of motive and because the
evidence was relevant to the elements of the conspiracy charge.3"
Although the trial judge believed the evidence was admissible because it was relevant to the conspiracy charge, the district court also examined the evidence in light of WRE 404(b) and applied the admissibility criteria set out by the Wyoming Supreme Court in Vigil v. State.3 Vigil required
a timely objection to admission of uncharged misconduct before the prosecution was required to show the evidence was offered for a proper purpose
under WRE 404(b).32 The Vigil court also held it would follow the lead of
the United States Supreme Court and adopted the 4-part test from Huddleston v. United States.33
At trial, only the police detective offered testimony about Howard's
drug activity. 34 The State called Harlow to testify, but he refused to testify
on the drug evidence.35 Harlow was not charged with any drug related crime
26.
Howard,42 P.3d at 485.
27.
Id.
28.
Id.
29.
Appellee's Brief, supra note 4, at 11.
30.
Howard,42 P.3d at 486-87 (citing United States v. Williams, 900 F.2d 823, 825 (5th
Cir. 1990)).
31.
Id.; Vigil v. State, 926 P.2d 351 (Wyo. 1996).
32.
Vigil, 926 P.2d at 355.
33.
Id. See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691-92 (1988) (setting forth the 4part test). The Vigil Court explained:
The Huddleston Court held other acts evidence was admissible if: 1) it
was offered for a proper purpose; 2) it met relevancy requirements; 3) the
probative value was not outweighed by the potential for unfair prejudice
(from Rule 403); and 4) upon request the trial court would instruct the
jury that the evidence was to be considered only for the proper purpose
for which it was admitted.
Vigil, 926 P.2d at 355.
34.
Howard,42 P.3d at 485.
35.
Id.
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or offered immunity for his testimony and understandably invoked his Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination.36 The police detective's testimony related to statements Howard made over the course of three interviews.37 At first, Howard denied benefiting from the transactions and stated
38
that she allowed the transactions only as a favor to her friend Harlow.
Later, Howard admitted she had received money as a result of some of the
cash back transactions and that the purpose was to get money for drugs,
which she and Harlow shared.39
After the State rested, Howard moved for acquittal on all charges for
lack of evidence.4" The court granted acquittal on the two conspiracy counts
because there was no evidence presented to establish an agreement to commit forgery.4 1 The jury was given the duty to decide Howard's fate on one
forgery count and one count of unlawful use of a credit card.42 The jury
convicted Howard of forgery in violation of WYO. STAT. § 6-3-602(a)(ii),
and of unlawful use of a credit card, in violation of WYO. STAT. § 6-3802(a)(i).43 Harlow, meanwhile, pled guilty to charges of forgery and of
credit card fraud and agreed to testify against Howard.
Howard appealed claiming the court abused its discretion by admitting the drug evidence in light of the "Demand for Notice of Intent" to use
such evidence." The Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and
held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence.45 Without a district court order to do so, the State was under no obligation to notify the defense of its intent to use WRE 404(b) evidence. 46 Notification was mandatory only if the evidence was exculpatory. 47 The court
held that in the future, a demand for notice of intent to use WRE 404(b) evidence would be considered the same as a timely objection to the offering of
any WRE 404(b) evidence. 48 The State's response would then trigger an
admissibility hearing applying the Huddleston criteria adopted in Vigil.49
This case note will discuss why it was appropriate for the Wyoming
Supreme Court in Howard v. State to adopt a pretrial notice requirement for
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id.
Appellee's Brief, supra note 4, at 14.
Id.
Id. at 15-16.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 12.
Howard v. State, 42 P.3d 483, 494 (Wyo.2002).
Id.
Id.
Id.

48.

Id.

49.

Id.
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other acts evidence offered under WRE 404(b). First, this case note will
examine why pretrial notice for other acts evidence promotes fairness and
correct decisions on admissibility. Second, this case note will discuss why
there should be a good cause exception to pretrial notice in cases where witness intimidation is a concern. Finally, this case will urge the Wyoming
Supreme Court to more clearly define what is meant by a "timely" WRE
404(b) objection.
BACKGROUND

WRE 404(b) has developed with a watchful eye on Federal Rule of
Evidence 404(b) (hereinafter FRE 404(b)) and relevant case law pertaining
to the federal rule.5" The most recent changes to WRE 404(b) have been
made judicially rather than by amending the rule.5 The Howard court follows that trend by judicially adopting a pretrial notice requirement.52 A general discussion of FRE 404(b) and WRE 404(b) follows to highlight the interaction between the federal rule and the Wyoming rule.
Other Acts Evidence Under FederalLaw
The natural and inevitable tendency of the tribunal whether judge or jury - is to give excessive weight to the vicious record of crime thus exhibited, and either to allow it to
bear too strongly on the present charge, or to take the proof
of it as justifying condemnation irrespective of guilt of the
present charge.53
Rulings on whether to admit other acts evidence are frequently appealed and are a crucial part of a criminal trial.54 The evidence can be so
potentially damning to defendants that it has been referred to as a "Prosecutor's Delight."55 Generally, other acts evidence is not admissible to prove
that a person acted in accordance with her propensity to commit bad acts.56
50.
Vigil v. State, 926 P.2d 351, 354 (Wyo. 1996).
51.
Vigil, 926 P.2d at 354.
52.
Howard,42 P.3d at 494.
53.
State v. Zackowitz, 172 N.E. 466, 472 (N.Y. 1930).
54.
Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Worst Surprise ofAll: No Right to PretrialDiscovery of
the Prosecution'sUncharged Misconduct Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. REv. 247, 255-56 (1987)
(discussing the importance of appeals involving uncharged misconduct evidence).
55.
Id. at 249.
56.
FED.R.EVID. 404(a). Rule 404(a) states:
Evidence of a person's character or trait is not admissible for the purpose
of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except: (1)Character of Accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character
offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same; (2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of
the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same,
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FRE 404(b) allows for admission of other bad acts evidence offered for relevant and proper purposes distinct from the impermissible characterpropensity inference.57 FRE 404(b) states:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible
to prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for
other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused,
the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable
notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses
pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of
58
any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.
Although the Rule lists purposes for which the evidence may be ad59
mitted under FRE 404(b), the list is not exhaustive. Regardless of the purpose for which other acts evidence is potentially admissible, any other acts
evidence offered under FRE 404(b) is subject to the balancing test of FRE
403.' Federal Rule of Evidence 403 weighs the probative value of the evidence against its potential for unfair prejudice. 6
Standardof Proof
In Huddleston v. United States, the United States Supreme Court articulated the standard for admissibility of other acts evidence in the federal
courts.6' The Court held that evidence offered under FRE 404(b) is admissible if: (1) it is offered for a proper purpose; (2) it meets relevancy requirements; (3) the probative value is outweighed by the potential for unfair
prejudice (from Rule 403); and (4) upon request the trial court will instruct

or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by
the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was
the first aggressor, (3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of
a witness, as provided in rules 607, 608, and 609.

FED.R.EvID. 404(a).
FED.R.EvID. 404(b).
57.
FED.R.EvID. 404(b).
58.
CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 4.15 (2d ed. 1999).
59.
Id. § 4.16.
60.
FED.R.EVID. 403. Rule 403 provides, "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded
61.
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion
of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Id.
62. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691-92 (1988).
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol3/iss2/11
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the jury that the evidence is to be considered only for the proper purpose for
which it is admitted.63
Huddleston involved the admission of "similar acts" evidence to
show that Huddleston knew Memorex videotapes he was selling were stolen.' There was no dispute whether the tapes he sold were stolen; the only
question was whether Huddleston knew they were stolen. 65 The Prosecution
presented similar acts evidence that Huddleston had sold stolen goods from
the same source and should have known the videotapes in the present case
were stolen as well. 66 The trial court allowed the evidence to show Huddleston's knowledge and instructed the jury that the evidence was to be used for
6
that purpose only.67 Huddleston was convicted of possessing stolen goods. 1
He appealed, challenging the admissibility of the similar acts evidence.69
Prior to Huddleston the federal courts of appeals were divided on
what standard of proof to use for the admission of FRE 404(b) evidence that
was unsupported by a conviction.70 No courts of appeals had adopted a beyond a "reasonable doubt" standard of proof. The Seventh, Eighth, Ninth,
and D.C. Circuits had adopted a "clear and convincing" evidence standard of
proof.7 The Second Circuit had adopted a "preponderance of the evidence"
standard of proof.72 All of the federal courts, however, required that the decision be made by a judge pursuant to FRE 104(a). The Huddleston Court
adopted a more lenient standard than any of the three just described. In
Huddleston, the Court adopted a preponderance of the evidence standard of
proof, but added that the decision should be made pursuant to FRE 104(b). 3
Under FRE 104(b) the judge in a jury trial need only find that there is sufficient evidence to support a finding by a reasonable jury that the other acts
were proved by a preponderance of the evidence.74
The Huddleston Court noted its continuing concern that evidence
under FRE 404(b) may be unduly prejudicial to a jury, but held that sufficient protection from unfair prejudice is provided by other sources within the
Rules." It held that as long as the evidence satisfied relevancy requirements
63.
64.

Id. at 691.
Id. at 683.

65.

Id.

66.

Id. at 686.

67.
Id. at 684
68.
Id. at 682.
69.
Id. at 688.
70.
Id.
71.
Id.; United States v. Leight, 818 F.2d 1297, 1302 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Weber, 818 F.2d 14, 14 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v. Vaccaro, 816 F.2d 443, 452 (9th Cir.
1987); United States v. Lavelle, 751 F.2d 1266, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
72.
United States v. Leonard, 524 F.2d 1076, 1090-91 (2nd Cir. 1975).
73.
Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 689.
74.
Id.
75.
Id. at 691.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2003

7

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 3 [2003], No. 2, Art. 11
WYOMING LAW REVIEW

Vol. 3

76
it was up to the jury to find whether the alleged other act occurred. The
Court explained that the requirement of a non-character-propensity purpose,
and other protections, would preclude the State from parading potentially
77
prejudicial similar acts evidence past a jury. The Huddleston Court held it
was inconsistent with both the meaning of FRE 104(b) and the legislative
7
history of FRE 404(b) to require a finding by the judge before trial. "

After Huddleston, debate continued over procedures for admitting
FRE 404(b) evidence. Increasingly important in the debate was the role of
a pretrial
pretrial notice.79 In 1991, FRE 404(b) was amended to include
° The rule was
notice requirement for evidence offered under the rule."
amended for the stated purposes of reducing surprise and facilitating the
early resolution of admissibility issues."' The rule now includes the phrase:
[U]pon request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal
case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or
during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause
shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it intends
to produce at trial.8 2
OtherActs Evidence in Wyoming
The recent development of WRE 404(b) begins with Bishop v.
State. In Bishop v. State, the Wyoming Supreme Court adopted a five-part
test to evaluate admissibility of 404(b) evidence: (1) there must be plain,
clear, and convincing evidence; (2) the other acts must not be too remote in
time from the charged offense; (3) the evidence must be offered for a proper
purpose; (4) the element that the evidence was introduced to prove must
have been material; and (5) there must be a substantial probative need for
the evidence. 4 Applying the test, the Wyoming Supreme Court held that
evidence of other unsolved burglaries in the area in which Bishop was
85
charged, was improperly admitted (but that this was harmless error).
3

76.
77.

Id. at 689-90.

Id.
Id. at 688. "Petitioner's reading of 404(b) as mandating a preliminary finding by the
trial court that the act in question occurred not only superimposes a level of judicial oversight
that is nowhere apparent from the language of the provision, but it is simply inconsistent with
the legislative history behind Rule 404(b)." Id.
Imwinkelried, supra note 54, at 255.
79.
FED.R.EvID. 404(b).
80.
Id.
81.
82. Id.
Bishop v. State, 687 P.2d 242, 243 (Wyo. 1984).
83.
Id. at 244.
84.
Id. at 246.
85.

78.
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Lower courts were urged, but not required to follow the Bishop procedure
and give a reasoned basis for their decision based on the criteria. 6
As discussed, in 1988, the United States Supreme Court in Huddleston adopted the most lenient of the four possible standards of proof. Huddleston required only that there be sufficient evidence to support a finding by
a preponderance of the evidence that the other act occurred.87 In Bishop,
which was decided before Huddleston, the Wyoming Supreme Court
adopted a higher clear and convincing standard. 8 In 1989, the Wyoming
Supreme Court had an opportunity in Pena v. State to adopt the more lenient
standard articulated in Huddleston, but did not do so. In Pena, the Wyoming
Supreme Court reiterated the clear and convincing standard announced in
Bishop without mentioning Huddleston.s9 Wyoming was not alone in this
decision, as several other states refused to adopt the Huddleston standard for
proof.9"
The Vigil Decision
In 1996, the Wyoming Supreme Court held that it was the court's intention to follow the lead of the federal courts in evaluating other acts evidence. 9 In Vigil v. State the Wyoming Supreme Court adopted both the
four-part Huddleston test for admissibility and the Huddleston standard for
proof.92 The Wyoming Supreme Court also held that there must be a timely
objection to admission of other acts evidence before the prosecution was
required to show the evidence was offered for a proper purpose.9 3 The Vigil
court did not create a pretrial notice requirement, nor has WRE 404(b) been
amended to adopt the 1991 pretrial notice amendment added to FRE
404(b). 94
The Wyoming Supreme Court in Vigil clarified several other aspects
of evidence offered under WRE 404(b). First, upon request the trial court
should give a limiting instruction to the jury on the proper purpose of the
evidence. Second, if the evidence is challenged on appeal and there had
been no objection at trial, the accused may raise only a claim of plain error
and the prosecution may justify the evidence on any proper purpose under
WRE 404(b). Third, if a timely objection is lodged, then the trial court
86.
Howard v. State, 42 P.3d 483, 487 (Wyo. 2002).
87.
Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 681 (1988).
88.
Bishop, 687 P.2d at 244.
89.
Pena v. Wyoming, 780 P.2d 316 (Wyo. 1989).
90.
State v. Cofield, 605 A.2d 230, 234-35 (N.J. 1992); Daniels v. United States, 613
A.2d 342, 347 (D.C. 1992); Phillips v. State, 591 So.2d 987, 989 (Fla. 1991); State v. Garner,
806 P.2d 366, 370-74 (Colo. 1991).
91.
Vigil v. State, 926 P.2d 351, 354 (Wyo. 1996).
92.
Id.
93.
Id. at 355.
94.
Id.
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should apply the Huddleston test and the State is limited to the proper purpose for which the evidence was admitted.95
PRINCIPAL CASE

Melody Howard's trial took place in the Seventh Judicial District
Court. Evidence of Howard's drug use was allowed under two theories: (1)
because it was relevant to the conspiracy charge; and (2) because it was al96
lowable under WRE 404(b) to show motive. For purposes of admitting the
evidence under WRE 404(b), the district court held a hearing pursuant to
Vigil.97 The trial judge held that the drug evidence was admissible under
9 8 The Wyoming Supreme Court disagreed
WRE 404(b) to show motive.
with the district court's finding that the evidence was relevant as substantive
proof of the conspiracy charge, but agreed that it was admissible was under
99
WRE 404(b) to show at least partial motive.
Howard argued that the district court abused its discretion in admitting the drug evidence.' 00 Howard contended that Vigil required the prosecution to notify her of intent to use WRE 404(b) evidence in light of her reThe State countered that neither Vigil nor any provision of WRE
quest.'
404(b) required them to respond to a "Demand for Notice of Intent to Introduce Evidence Under 404(b)" and that such a demand was not a timely objection as required by Vigil." 2 The Howard court clarified that nowhere in
Vigil was the State required to respond to a demand for notice of intent to
introduce the evidence." 3 Vigil only required a response if a timely objection were lodged." °4 The Demand was not technically an objection so no
response was necessary.'0 5 The court went on to address the question of
whether a demand for notice should be considered a timely objection."
The Howard court found that the stated purpose of the Vigil decision
was to conform the Wyoming procedure to the procedure used in the federal
courts.'0 7 Justice Hill stated that "[u]nder the current federal rule a defendant's request for notice would have triggered a duty on the part of the State
to provide him with reasonable notice in advance of the trial of the general
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id.
Howard v. State, 42 P.3d 483, 490 (Wyo. 2002).
Id. at 485.
Id.
Id. at 486-87.
Id. at 486.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 488.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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nature of any WRE 404(b) evidence it intended to use at trial."' 8 Wyoming,
however, had not adopted the 1991 amendment to FRE 404(b). 9 Accordingly, the State in Howard was under no duty to respond to the Demand for
Notice." ° The Howard case brought to light a discrepancy between FRE
404(b) and WRE 404(b)."' As Justice Hill stated, "From this proposition
then followed the specific holding that has led to the problem so well exemplified by the instant case ....
Under Vigil, the State is required to justify the evidence and the trial
court is required to evaluate admissibility only in the presence of a timely
objection." 3 As Justice Hill stated, "The problem, of course, is that if the
State is allowed to withhold its WRE 404(b) evidence until the trial is underway, the defendant's opportunity to file a timely objection is largely illusory. '"' 4 The Wyoming Supreme Court in Howard upheld the conviction
and held that in the future:
[W]here a defendant files a pretrial demand for notice of intent to introduce evidence under W.R.E. 404(b), the same
shall be treated as the making of a timely objection to the introduction of such evidence. The State must then respond
with sufficient information to meet the balance of the Hud5
dleston test adopted in Vigil.,
ANALYSIS

First, this analysis will discuss why it was appropriate for the Wyoming Supreme Court in Howard v. State to make pretrial notice for other
acts evidence a reality in Wyoming. In supporting the appropriateness of the
Howard rule, this analysis will discuss the benefits and possible objections
to pretrial notice for other acts evidence. Second, this analysis will discuss
why WRE 404(b) should have a good cause exception to the pretrial notice
requirement. Finally, this analysis will highlight the ambiguity of what a
"timely" objection is and urge the Wyoming Supreme Court to more clearly
define what the term means.

108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 490.
Id. at 491.
Id. at 490.
Id.

112.

Id.

113.
114.
115.

Id.
Id. at 491.
Id.
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Making PretrialNotice a Reality in Wyoming
Prior to the 1991 amendment to FRE 404(b) and continuing today,
there was significant debate among academics, prosecutors, and defense
attorneys about the utility of pretrial notice. The arguments supporting pretrial notice proved more persuasive in 1991, and a pretrial notice require6
ment was added to FRE 404(b)." WRE 404(b) has never been amended to
7
adopt a pretrial notice requirement." In Howard, however, the Wyoming
Supreme Court judicially adopted a pretrial notice requirement for other acts
evidence offered under WRE 404(b)."'
Prior to Howard, the Wyoming Supreme Court held in Vigil that a
timely objection to WRE 404(b) evidence would trigger an admissibility
decision, but since the defense could not know about the 404(b) evidence
until it was offered at trial, the ability to object to other acts evidence was
largely illusory." 9 In Howard, the Wyoming Supreme Court wisely created
the equivalent of a pretrial notice requirement for WRE 404(b) evidence.
20
The court made a demand for notice the equivalent of a timely objection.
A demand for notice now creates an affirmative duty to disclose other acts
evidence intended to be used at trial. The demand also triggers application
of the admissibility standards adopted in Vigil.
PretrialNotice Promotes Fairness and CorrectAdmissibility Decisions
A pretrial notice requirement is an important tool for ensuring fairness and correct admissibility decisions. Pretrial notice enhances the judge's
ability to correctly rule on admissibility, avoids the pitfalls of trial by ambush, and generally gives the defendant the ability to meet the case brought
against her. 2 ' These factors greatly contribute to better trials for both prosecutors and defendants.
Other acts evidence is generally inadmissible to support a general inThe evidence, however, may be
ference of the defendant's bad character.'
admissible if it is offered on a non-character theory of logical relevance such
The line between inas motive, plan, intent, opportunity, or knowledge.'
evidence can be
non-character
admissible
and
evidence
character
admissible

FED.R.EvLD. 404(b).
116.
WYo.R.EvID. 404(b).
117.
Howard, 42 P.3d at 491.
118.
Vigil v. State, 926 P.2d 351, 354 (Wyo. 1996).
119.
Howard, 42 P.3d at 491.
120.
Imwinkelried, supra note 54, at 255 (discussing and advocating reasons for pretrial
121.
discovery, but noting that pretrial notice could facilitate perjury by defense witnesses and
possibly lead to witness intimidation).
122.

FED.R.EvID. 404(a).

123.

FED.R.EvID. 404(b).
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fine. 24 Trial judges are charged with the duty to draw the line amidst the
subtle and even "paradoxical" distinctions between admissible and inadmissible other acts evidence.'2 5 It is reasonable to believe that this takes time
and careful consideration. As Chief Justice Hill stated in Howard, "Rulings
on uncharged misconduct evidence are too important to be made in the heat
and pressure of a trial, with the jury twiddling its thumbs in the next
room." '26 A trial judge is more likely to err in drawing the line if surprised
by the evidence and required to rule on the spur of the moment. Having an
effective pretrial notice requirement allows a trial judge to be more informed
and more meticulous in analyzing admissibility.
Eliminating Trial by Ambush
Absent a pretrial notice requirement there exists a risk that prosecution attorneys will adopt surprise trial tactics. 7 Pretrial notice reduces the
chance of trial by ambush and gives the defendant the ability to meet the
case brought against her. If the defense is notified about the other acts evidence it will have an opportunity to investigate fully both the factual basis
and the legal precedent for the other acts evidence. If the prosecution surprises the defense with other acts evidence, then the defense is likely to be
unprepared meet the evidence. 2 This puts the defense at a great disadvan-

124.
H. Richard Uviller, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: Illusion, Illogic, and
Injustice in the Courtroom, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 845, 879 (1982). Professor Uviller states:

[T]he division between the prescribed and the proscribed uses of the fact
of prior conviction may be a bit difficult to perceive. The layman's difficulty, moreover, rests on a solid logical basis. The evidence of prior
crime is admissible to show knowledge or the absence of mistake because
a person who has once engaged in such a transaction demonstrates or acquires a trait of character that might be termed "criminal sophistication."
Evidence of that trait supports the supposition that the defendant was
criminally sophisticated in the transaction in question. Put more generally, evidence of the prior crime tends to prove that a defendant's conduct
was criminal in the case in issue because of the assumed continuity and
dominance of a relevant trait of character. Precisely the same principle
would admit the evidence to prove the defendant's commission of the
later crime as action in conformity with established character - the very
device explicitly barred by the federal rules. It thus appears that, although
an element of a crime or aspect may be proved by evidence of prior misconduct, the crime itself may not be. An inexplicable paradox can no
longer be denied.
Id.

125.
126.
127.
128.

Uviller, supra note 124, at 379.
Howard v. State, 42 P.3d 483, 491 (Wyo. 2002).
lmwinkelried, supra note 54, at 259.
Id. at 260.
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tage, especially considering the gravity and importance often placed on the
129
other acts evidence.
Possible Criticismsof PretrialNotice
While arguments for pretrial notice are compelling, there are two
strong objections to such a requirement. Generally the arguments are as
follows: (1) pretrial discovery may facilitate perjury by defense witnesses if
they have time to concoct false rebuttals to the other acts evidence; and (2)
disclosure of witnesses could lead to witness intimidation. These arguments
were made prior to the amendment of FRE 404(b) and continue today. The
Howard court did not address these concerns, but it is useful to understand
what may have been keeping the court from adopting a pretrial notice requirement prior to Howard.
The first criticism of a pretrial notice requirement is that the defense
is given the opportunity to fabricate perjured testimony to rebut the state's
other acts evidence. 3 This problem has not been overlooked, but its validity is questionable. Justice Brennan dubbed this concern "the old hobgoblin."'' Little evidence concerning the magnitude of the problem exists and
2 The criticism also overlooks the need
the risk has largely gone unverified.
33 In Howard, as in other
to deter perjury by the prosecution's witnesses.'
cases involving other acts evidence, the prosecution's witnesses are often the
defendant's accomplices. 34 If the accomplice is looking to gain favor with
the prosecution (i.e. plea bargain) then there is strong motivation for the accomplice to give perjured testimony. 3 If there is pretrial notice, however,
the accomplice would likely realize that the defense will have time to expose
the perjured testimony, requiring him to think twice about the truthfulness of
his testimony.36
A second argument against pretrial notice is embodied in the fear
that if the defense learns the identity of the prosecution's witnesses before
trial, then the defendant will have the opportunity to intimidate the prosecu129. Id. at 259-60.
William J. Brennan, J.R., The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event of Quest for the
130.
Truth?, 1963 WASH. U. L.Q. 279, 289 (1963).
Id. at 291.
131.
Id. at 290 n.39. "What meager statistical evidence there is suggests that perjury is a
132.
very slight danger indeed." Id. See Robert L. Fletcher, PretrialDiscovery in State Criminal
Cases, 12 STAN. L. REv. 293, 310 (1960) (stating that the risk of defense perjury is an "unverified assertion").
Fletcher, supra note 132, at 309-11.
133.
Howard v. State, 42 P.3d 483, 485 (Wyo. 2002) (explaining that the accomplice was
134.
called to the stand but refused to testify); United States v. Shepard, 793 F.2d 510, 513 (10th
Cir. 1984) (explaining that the prosecution's case rested entirely on testimony from an accomplice).
Fletcher, supra note 132, at 308-09.
135.
Id.
136.
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tion's witness. Witness intimidation is a viable concern for prosecutors. If it
is thought that being a witness means being harassed, then potential witnesses may be reluctant to testify. Although it is believed that witness intimidation only occurs in a minority of cases, there is data to suggest thousands of examples of such activity.' The Federal Rule has eliminated much
of the concern over witness intimidation by including a "good cause" provision in FRE 404(b). The good cause provision allows the prosecution to
move that a witness's identity be protected in a case where intimidation is
likely. In Wyoming, however, neither the Wyoming Supreme Court nor the
Wyoming Legislature has adopted a "good cause" provision for WRE
404(b).
Admission During Trialfor "Good Cause"
Either by judicial decision or rulemaking, the Wyoming Supreme
Court should clear up any ambiguity by adopting a good cause exception to
the Howard notice requirement. The court stated in Vigil it was the court's
intention to conform the Wyoming rules of evidence to the federal rules of
evidence so that Wyoming attorneys would have a wider scope of case law
to refer to when dealing with WRE 404(b) issues.'38 Adopting a good cause
exception would further the stated goal of Vigil.
In addition to expanding relevant case law for Wyoming attorneys to
reference, allowing pretrial notice to be suspended for "good cause" helps to
reduce the fear of witness intimidation. It is not hard to conceive an example where the judge perceives a reasonable threat of witness intimidation. If
counsel can persuade the trial judge of the veracity and credibility of a
threat, then counsel may be able to have pretrial notice suspended for good
cause. In the absence of a good cause exception, the trial judge may not be
able to suppress the identity of the witness even though there is a significant
threat of witness intimidation.
Interpreting "Timeliness"
The Howard decision created a pretrial notice requirement for other
acts evidence in Wyoming by making a demand for notice the same as an
objection.' 39 It is still unclear, however, when the demand needs to be submitted. To trigger the four-part admissibility test the objection must be
"timely."' 40 Similarly, under FRE 404(b), the demand is expected to be
timely."" Other than requiring that the request and notice be in advance of

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Imwinkelried, supra note 54, at 270.
Vigil v. State, 926 P.2d 351, 354 (Wyo. 1996).
Howard v. State, 42 P.3d 483, 491 (Wyo. 2002).
Id.
FED.R.EvID. 404(b).
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trial, however, no other specific time limits are stated in the Federal Rule. 42
Wyoming can look to the federal courts of appeals, State courts, and other
Federal Rules of Evidence for guidance in defining timely.
Interpretation of what is timely varies widely in the federal and State
courts. In the Eleventh Circuit notice immediately before trial will suffice. 143
A Florida statute requires notice of intent to use the evidence 10 days before
trial. '" Texas has no time constraint. 145
Other Federal Rules of Evidence have set time constraints on when
other acts evidence has to be disclosed. 46 FRE 413 through FRE 415 deal
with the admission of similar crimes evidence in sexual assault and molestation cases. 14' Any evidence offered under these rules has to be disclosed at
least fifteen days before the scheduled trial date. 14 ' The time limit is not
absolute; the court
may allow the evidence to be disclosed later if good
149
shown.
is
cause
The definition of "timely" in Wyoming and in other courts that have
not decided the issue directly will depend largely on the facts and circumstances of each case.150 This author suggests the adoption of a rule similar to
the 10-day rule followed by Florida. For pretrial notice to be effective and
provide the benefits discussed herein it is important that all parties involved
have a clear representation of what the case is about. Without a clear definition of what is meant by timely there remains a strong motivation to wait
until the last minute to disclose other acts evidence. If this is allowed to
happen the pretrial notice requirement created in Howard may be rendered
impotent by trial courts that allow for last minute disclosure of the evidence.
There may be times when extraneous circumstances exist and the facts of the
case support an exception for good cause, but it would benefit the Wyoming
courts to have a guiding principle as to what satisfies timeliness.
CONCLUSION

The court in Howard appropriately created a pretrial notice requirement. While there is still an obligation on the part of the defense to file a
demand for notice, this formality should not stand in the way of eliminating
the prior unfairness of not having a pretrial notice requirement. No longer
will trial by ambush be routine in the Wyoming courts. There still remains,
142.
143.
144.

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id.
United States v. Perez-Tosta, 36 F.3d 1552, 1560-62 (11th Cir. 1994).
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.404(2)(b) (West 2001).
TEX.R.EvlD. 404(b).
FED.R.EVID. 413; FED.R.EvID 414; FED.R.EvID 415.
Id.
Id.
Id.
FED.R.EvID. 404(b).
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however, room for improvement and clarification on the rule. A good cause
exception should be added to WRE 404(b) in order to eliminate concerns
over witness intimidation. The Wyoming Supreme Court should also clarify
what is meant by timeliness so that the pretrial notice requirement created in
Howard is not circumvented by allowing last minute disclosure of other acts
evidence.
ROBERT S. HITCHCOCK
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